The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2009 Year in Review by Malson, Laurel Pyke et al.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 17 | Number 1 Article 5
2011






Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laurel Pyke Malson et al., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2009 Year in Review, 17 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 39 (2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol17/iss1/5
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT: 2009 YEAR IN REVIEW
Laurel Pyke Malson, Katherine Nesbitt, Aryeh Portnoy, Birgit Kurtz,
John Murino, Joshua Dermott, Beth Goldman, Arash Jahanian,
Marguerite Walter and Howard Yuan*
INTRODUCTION: THE FSIA IN 2009 ..................... 40
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA .................. 41
II. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE:
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, ORGANS, AGENCIES
AND INSTRUMENTALITIES ....................... 42
A. WHAT IS A "FOREIGN STATE"? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
1. Entities That Qualified as a Foreign State or
Agency or Instrumentality of a Foreign State ....... 43
2. Individual Foreign Officials ..... . ............... 44
B. "GOVERNMENTAL" VERSUS "COMMERCIAL" AGENCIES
AND INSTRUMENTALITIES: THE "CORE FUNCTIONS
TEST"................................................... 47
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF
IMMUNITY ..................................... 48
A. WAIVER - § 1605(A)(1) .......................... 48
1. Explicit Waiver .............................. 48
2. Implicit Waiver ..... ....................... 48
B. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY - § 1605(A)(2) .............. 50
1. What Acts Are Considered Commercial?........... 50
2. What Acts Create a Sufficient Nexus with the
United States? .............................. 55
C. TAKINGS - § 1605(A)(3) .......................... 61
D. NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS - § 1605(A)(5) ............ 63
E. ARBITRATION - § 1605(A)(6)...................... 66
F. TERRORISM - § 1605A, § 1605 (A)(7), AND OTHER
CLAIMS................................................ 66
1. Implementation of § 1605A ..................... 67
2. Dismissal of Claims Against Specific Nations ...... 70
G. COUNTERCLAIM - § 1607......................... 72
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST FOREIGN
SOVEREIGNS ................................... 72
A. THE COMMERCIAL AcrIVrY EXCEPTION TO
IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT ....................... 73
* The authors are attorneys at Crowell & Moring LLP. Special thanks to Lisa Savitt
and David Bell for their comments.
39
40 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
B. THE TERRORISM EXCEPTION: TERRORISM RISK
INSURANCE ACT ("TRIA") AND BLOCKED ASSETS.... 73
V. Practical Issues in FSIA Litigation ....................... 75
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS.............................. 75
B. PERSONAL JURISDICION ........................... 77
C. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS.............................. 77
D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS............................. 79







foreign sovereign in U.S. courts. While the FSIA generally grants
immunity to foreign sovereigns, it also lays out a number of exceptions
under which U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have used
this statute as a basis to sue foreign governments and their agencies and
instrumentalities in a variety of contexts, ranging from purely commercial
disputes to wrongful death claims on behalf of victims of state-sponsored
terrorism.
Litigation involving the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) con-
tinues to be an active and dynamic area of the law. In 2009, the number
of published opinions issued in United States federal courts remained
consistently high, with over 120 published decisions over the course of the
year, including two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court.
As in years past, FSIA decisions in 2009 addressed claims in high-pro-
file, politically-charged cases, involving, for example, claims against the
Holy See by victims of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic priests, claims by
relatives of Holocaust survivors against sovereign states and state-owned
museums seeking restitution for art stolen by the Nazi Regime and later
acquired by the defendants, and claims against the Government of Iraq
for acts of terrorism carried out by the Saddam Hussein regime, to name
just a few.
The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the primary
areas of litigation under the FSIA through an analysis of 2009 judicial
decisions under the statute. This review addresses the core issues affect-
ing foreign sovereigns that are parties to litigation in courts in the United
States:
1. Who or what is considered a "foreign state" subject to the FSIA?
2. Under what circumstances will a foreign state lose its otherwise gen-
erally recognized sovereign immunity?
3. What are the rules on attaching a foreign sovereign's assets located
within the United States?
The review also includes a short introduction to the FSIA as well as
some practical guidance for foreign sovereigns based on the most recent
FSIA decisions.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA
Foreign sovereigns have enjoyed immunity from suit in U.S. courts for
nearly two centuries. As early as 1812, in The Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Faddon, U.S. courts declined to assert jurisdiction over cases involving
foreign government defendants, a practice rooted in a sense of "grace and
comity" between the United States and other nations.' Judges instead
deferred to the views of the Executive Branch as to whether such cases
should proceed in U.S. courts, exercising jurisdiction only where the U.S.
State Department expressly referred claims for their consideration.2
In 1952, U.S. courts' jurisdiction over claims against foreign states and
their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State Department is-
sued the so-called "Tate Letter," announcing the Department's adoption
of a new "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity to guide
courts in invoking jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. The "Tate Letter"
directed that foreign sovereigns continue to be entitled to immunity from
suits involving their sovereign or "public" acts.3 But, acts in a commercial
or "private" capacity would no longer be protected from U.S. court re-
view.4 Yet, even with this new guidance, courts continued to seek the
Executive Branch's views on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to
assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns under a system that risked in-
consistency and susceptibility to "diplomatic pressures rather than to the
rule of law." 5
In 1976, Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the FSIA,
essentially codifying the "restrictive theory" of immunity and empower-
ing the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity without resort
to the Executive Branch.6 Today, the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts.7
The FSIA provides that "foreign states"-including their "political
subdivisions" and "agencies or instrumentalities" 8-shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of the exceptions to immu-
nity set forth in the statute applies. 9 The FSIA includes several provi-
sions that define the scope of.a foreign state's immunity and establishes
detailed procedural requirements for bringing claims against a sovereign
defendant.10
The exceptions to immunity are set forth in sections 1605 and 1605(A)
1. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812).
2. See Verlinden B.V v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983) (explaining
history of the FSIA).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quot-
ing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'1 Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990)).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2010).
7. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
9. See id. § 1604.
10. See generally id. §§ 1604-05, 1608.
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of the FSIA."1 These exceptions include, inter alia, certain claims based
on commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tortious or ter-
rorist acts by foreign sovereign entities.12 In most instances, where a
claim falls under one of the FSIA exceptions, the Act provides that the
foreign state shall be subject to jurisdiction in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual.' 3 The FSIA also includes separate
provisions establishing immunity (and exceptions to immunity) from the
attachment of property located in the United States in aid of execution of
a judgment against a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities.' 4
Finally, the FSIA sets forth various unique procedural rules for claims
against foreign states, including special rules for service of process, de-
fault judgments, and appeals.' 5
II. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE: POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, ORGANS, AGENCIES,
AND INSTRUMENTALITIES
A threshold issue in any FSIA case is whether the defendant qualifies
as a "foreign state" entitled to immunity. For purposes of the FSIA, "for-
eign states" include not only the states themselves, but also agencies and
instrumentalities thereof.16 To qualify as an "agency or instrumentality"
of a foreign state, an entity must be a "separate legal person," that is
"neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under the
laws of any third country" and either "an organ of a foreign state or polit-
ical subdivision" or an entity, "a majority of whose shares or other owner-
ship interest is owned by a foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof."17
A. WHAT IS A "FOREIGN STATE"?
Whether an entity qualifies as a foreign state is a fundamental inquiry
in any FSIA case because it dictates whether the court will be able to
assert jurisdiction over the claim. If an entity is deemed to be a foreign
state, it may be sued in a U.S. court only if the claim falls within one of
the exceptions set forth in the statute.'8
Determining whether an entity is a "foreign state" and therefore enti-
tled to the protections of the FSIA is a fact specific inquiry, requiring
11. See id. §§ 1605-05(A).
12. Id.
13. See id. § 1606; but see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) (providing a federal statutory cause of
action for terrorism-related acts).
14. See id. §§ 1610-1611. For example, property belonging to a foreign central bank or
monetary authority and held for its own account is immune from suit absent a
waiver. Id. § 1611(b)(1). Likewise, military property held by a military authority
and used or intended to be used in connection with a military activity is immune
from attachment. Id. § 1611(b)(2).
15. See, e.g., id. §§ 1605(g), 1608.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
17. Id. § 1603(b).
18. See id. § 1605.
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careful attention to the specific nature and functions of the defendant. In
2009, the following decisions illustrate how U.S. courts have addressed
the status of a variety of entities under the FSIA.
1. Entities That Qualified as a Foreign State or Agency or
Instrumentality of a Foreign State
a. National and Vatican Banks
In Alperin v. Vatican Bank, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
a class action against the Vatican Bank, also known officially as Instituto
per le Opere di Religione (IOR), finding that the entity is an "organ" of
the Vatican and, therefore, an "agency or instrumentality" of a sovereign
state entitled to immunity.19 The appellate court examined the following
factors to determine whether the IOR was an organ of the foreign state:
[1] the circumstances surrounding the entity's creation,
[2] the purpose of its activities,
[3] its independence from the government,
[4] the level of government financial support,
[5] its employment policies, and
[6] its obligations and privileges under state law. 2 0
The court held that, based on an affidavit describing its "status, struc-
ture, and role under Vatican law," the IOR established a prima facie case
that it is an agency or instrumentality of the Vatican.21 Specifically, the
Pope created the IOR "as a public and independent juridic entity that is
responsible for managing assets placed in its care for the purpose of sup-
porting religious or charitable works," and the IOR maintains exclusive
control over a number of obligations established under Vatican law.2 2
Moreover, the Vatican appointed the high-ranking government officials
seated at the highest administrative level of the IOR.2 3 Finally, the court
noted that, under Italian law, "the IOR is immune from suit in Italy as a
foreign sovereign." 24 Based on these factors, the court held that the IOR
was entitled to immunity under the FSIA as an agency or instrumentality
of the Vatican.25
b. Police Services
In A.R. Int'l Anti-Fraud Sys., Inc. v. Pretoria National Central Bureau
of Interpol, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
concluded that defendant Interpol Pretoria was entitled to a presumption
of statutory immunity from suit, based on its claim that it was a foreign
19. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 360 F. App'x 847, 849 (9th Cir. 2009).
20. Id. (citing Cal. Dep't of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1102 (9th Cir.
2008)).
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state within the meaning of the FSIA.2 6 Additionally, the plaintiff as-
serted that as a member of the International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion "Interpol," "Interpol Pretoria is a section of the South African Police
Service and part of the government of the Republic of South Africa." 27
c. Foreign Consulates
In Box v. Dallas Mexican Consulate General, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas determined that the Mexican Consu-
late General located in Dallas, Texas, "is a separate legal entity, is an
organ of Mexico, and is neither a citizen of a State of the United States
nor created under the laws of a third country."28 The court did not find it
necessary to engage in any analysis to determine whether the entity was
either a "foreign state" or "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state," concluding instead that the Mexican Consulate General was both
and therefore subject to the immunity protections of the FSIA.2 9
2. Individual Foreign Officials
Courts have taken different approaches in determining whether the im-
munity of individual officers of a foreign state is governed by the FSIA or
by other sources of immunity such as international treaty or common
law.3 0 In 2008, the Second Circuit held, in In re Terrorist Attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, that an individual official of a foreign state acting in his
official capacity is an "agency or instrumentality" of the state and there-
fore protected under the FSIA. 31 Other courts, however, have held that
the immunity of foreign state officials is not governed by the FSIA, but
rather is governed by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.32
In 2009, the debate continued.33
a. Former Foreign Officials
In Yousuf v. Samantar, the Fourth Circuit held that the FSIA does not
apply to individual foreign government agents, including former govern-
ment agents, even when sued in their official capacities. 34 In Yousuf,
26. A.R. Int'l Anti-Fraud Sys., Inc. v. Pretoria Nat'l Cent. Bureau of Interpol, 634 F.
Supp. 2d 1108, 1113-14 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
27. Id. at 1114.
28. Box v. Dallas Mexican Consulate Gen., No. 3:08-CV-1010-0, 2009 WL 3163551 at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2009).
29. Id.
30. See In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 81; See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010).
31. In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 81.
32. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
33. In June 2010, after initial publication of this 2009 Year-in-Review, the Supreme
Court resolved the debate and held in Samantar v. Yousuf, that the immunity of
foreign state officials is not governed by the FSIA. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at
2278.
34. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd and remanded by Sa-
mantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.Ct. 2278 (2010).
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Somalian natives brought suit against a high-ranking government official
for alleged acts of torture and human rights violations committed against
them by soldiers under his command.35 The district court dismissed the
claims, finding that the defendant official enjoyed immunity under the
FSIA, and the plaintiffs appealed. 36 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that Congress did not intend to shield individual foreign government
agents from suit under the FSIA.3 7 The court reasoned that sections
1603(a) and (b) and the overall structure of the FSIA demonstrated Con-
gress's intent to shield only business entities.38 Specifically, the court
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's analysis that the term "separate legal
person" has the "ring of the familiar legal concept that corporations are
persons, which are subject to suit," and therefore, "the FSIA's use of the
phrase 'separate legal person' suggests that corporations or other busi-
ness entities, but not natural persons, may qualify as agencies or instru-
mentalities. "3 The court found additional support for its holding in the
statute's legislative history, as well as the requirement that the "entity" be
"neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (e) of Title 28, nor created under the laws of any third coun-
try"-language that the court found to clearly relate to corporate enti-
ties.40 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
on this point.41
In Matar v. Dichter, the defendants argued that former foreign officials
are entitled to immunity under the FSIA.42 In Matar, survivors of an
Israeli military attack on a suspected terrorist sued the former head of the
Israeli Security Agency, alleging war crimes and violations of interna-
tional law.4 3 The trial court had dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that the defendant, as a foreign official, was immune from suit under the
FSIA.4 4 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the FSIA does not apply
because the defendant is no longer a foreign official.45 Specifically, the
plaintiff relied on the Supreme Court's 2003 opinion, Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, which established that a corporation's "instrumentality status
is determined at the time suit is filed," arguing that this principle should
extend to individual officials as well.4 6 Ultimately, the Second Circuit
elected not to decide the issue, finding the defendant immune under prin-
ciples of common law.4 7 The court held that "the common law of foreign
35. Samantar, 552 F.3d at 373.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 380-81.
38. Id. at 378-81.
39. Id. at 380 (citing Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005)).
40. Id.
41. Samarntar, 130 S.Ct. 2278.
42. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2009).
43. Id. at 10-11.
44. Id. at 11; See Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, 563 F.3d
9 (2d Cir. 2009).
45. Matar, 563 F.3d at 12.
46. Id. (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003)).
47. Id. at 14.
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sovereign immunity recognize[s] an individual official's entitlement to im-
munity for 'acts performed in his official capacity." 48 The court then
concluded that "[a]n immunity based on acts-rather than status-does
not depend on tenure in office."49 The court noted further that, before
the enactment of the FSIA, courts deferred to the decision of the Execu-
tive on matters of sovereign immunity.50 Because the Department of
State filed a "Statement of Interest in the district court specifically recog-
nizing ... [the defendant's] entitlement to immunity," the court similarly
found the defendant immune from suit under principles of common
law.5'
b. Diplomats
In Swarna v. Al-Awadi, a former live-in domestic servant filed suit
against the State of Kuwait and her former employers: a diplomat serving
at the Permanent Mission of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations
and his wife.52 The plaintiff sought damages under New York's labor
laws and the Alien Tort Statute for subjecting her to slavery and slavery-
like practices including involuntary servitude, forced labor, assault, and
sexual abuse.53 The Southern District of New York held that the individ-
ual defendants were not entitled to immunity under either the FSIA or
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations because the alleged acts
were private acts, not "performed. . .in the exercise of [the diplomat's]
functions as a member of the mission."54 Thus, while the court held that
the FSIA applies generally to claims against foreign officials, immunity
did not attach because the acts alleged were carried out by the defendants
in their personal (non-official) capacities.55
c. Consular Officials
In Johnson v. United Kingdom, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Connecticut was faced with the question of whether a consular official
is entitled to immunity under the FSIA.56 The district court held that the
official was immune under the Vienna Convention for Consular Relations
and declined to address the applicability of the FSIA to consular
officials.57




52. Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
53. Id. at 512.
54. Id. at 518, 522 (citing Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 32,
art. 39(2)).
55. Id. at 522.
56. Johnson v. United Kingdom, 608 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295-96 (D. Conn. 2009).
57. Id.
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d. New Proposed Legislation
The debate regarding individual immunity under the FSIA may be re-
solved by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (Terrorism Act),
a bill introduced in Congress on December 23, 2009, by Senator Arlen
Specter, along with co-sponsors Senator Charles Schumer and Senator
Lindsey Graham.58 The Terrorism Act, among other things, seeks to
amend § 1604, the FSIA's general provision of immunity, to provide that
a claim against an official or employee of a state or organ thereof, acting
within the scope of office or employment, shall be asserted against the
state itself.59 As of 2010, the proposed bill has not yet been passed by
Congress.
B. "GOVERNMENTAL" VERSUS "COMMERCIAL" AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES: THE "CORE FUNCTIONS TEST"
An "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign sovereign is subject to dif-
ferent statutory rules than the "foreign state" itself as to certain issues. In
particular, rules relating to service of process, venue, availability of puni-
tive damages, and attachment of assets differ depending on whether the
defendant is deemed an agency of the state or the state itself.60 Thus, a
court often must decide whether the defendant is the "foreign state," or
an "agency or instrumentality" of the foreign state. To make this deter-
mination, courts apply the "core functions test."6' Under this test, if the
entity's predominant activities, or "core functions," are "governmental"
in nature, courts will treat the entity as if it is the state itself, applying
rules and standards more protective of the sovereign. 62 But, if the en-
tity's "core functions" are predominantly "commercial" in character,
courts will apply the less protective rules and standards reserved for agen-
cies and instrumentalities of the state.
In 2009, in Figueiredo v. Republic of Peru, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York applied the "core functions" test to
determine that a Brazilian corporation could enforce a Peruvian arbitral
award against the Republic of Peru, the Ministry of Housing, Construc-
tion and Sanitation of the Republic, and the Programa Agua Para Todos
(together "the Program"). 63 The court held that the Program was a polit-
ical organ or subdivision of the Republic, because it performed a govern-
mental, rather than a commercial, function. 64 Specifically, the Republic
created and funded the Program as a public entity in the Executive
58. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2930, 111th Cong. (2009).
59. S. 2930 § 4.
60. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a) & (b) (service of process), 1391(f)(3) (permitting
venue in suits against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in any judicial
district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or is doing
business), 1610(a) & (b) (attachment of assets).
61. Figueiredo v. Republic of Peru, 655 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 370.
64. Id.
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Branch to implement a national drinking water and sanitation program
and to coordinate and manage various sanitation infrastructure pro-
grams.65 Thus, because of its "quintessential governmental functions,"
the Program was held to be a political organ of the state, and its signature
to the arbitration agreement was binding on the Peruvian Government. 66
Accordingly, the Program was not entitled to immunity.67
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY
The FSIA provides for seven exceptions to the general grant of immu-
nity.6 8 The 2009 decisions addressing those exceptions are discussed
below.
A. WAIVER-§ 1605(A)(1)
Section 1605(a)(1) provides that a foreign sovereign does not enjoy im-
munity from suit in any case
in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver. 69
In 2009, courts addressed both explicit and implicit waivers of sover-
eign immunity.
1. Explicit Waiver
In Capital Ventures Int'l v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit
held that Argentina explicitly waived immunity where it stated in a con-
tract that it waived "any immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from jurisdic-
tion of any court."70 The court held that no reference to the United
States was required in the waiver clause and that "a waiver of sovereign
immunity can be explicit even when other provisions of the document are
applicable only to specific, non-United States jurisdictions." 71
2. Implicit Waiver
Courts have found implied waivers in a variety of circumstances, in-
cluding: (1) where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another
country; (2) where the foreign state has agreed that the law of a particular
country should govern the contract; or (3) where the foreign state has
filed a responsive pleading without raising the defense of sovereign im-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 370-71.
67. Id.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2010).
69. Id. §1605(a)(1).
70. Capital Venture Int'l v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289, 294, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).
71. Id. at 296.
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munity.72 But this list is not exclusive and courts generally look to
whether "a direct connection between the sovereign's activities in United
States courts and plaintiff's claims for relief" exists.73
3. Agreement to Participate in Alternative Dispute Resolution
In Odfjell Seachem A/S v. Continental De Petrols Et Investment SA, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the
defendant's submission of a demand for arbitration of the dispute and
agreement to enforce the judgment was "wholly inconsistent with any as-
sertion of FSIA immunity" from attachment of assets.74
On the other hand, in A.R. Int'l Anti-Fraud Systems, Inc., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California found that an agreement
to participate in that court's voluntary dispute resolution program did not
equate to an agreement to arbitrate the dispute.75 The court reasoned
that, unlike arbitration, the evaluation of the case under the program "is
not a judgment of the court, is made without prejudice, and is non-bind-
ing." 76 In addition, the court found pertinent a letter in which the defen-
dant's representative made clear that participation in the program was
not a waiver of immunity.77
4. Choice of U.S. Law
In Ghawanmeh v. Islamic Saudi Acad., the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the Islamic Saudi Academy had implicitly
waived immunity by agreeing to resolve all contract disputes under Vir-
ginia law.7 8
5. Responding to Discovery
Finally, in Inversora Murten, S.A. v. Energoprojekt Holding Co., the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that, where the
defendant consistently had asserted immunity, it did not implicitly waive
immunity simply by responding to a discovery request. 79 According to
the court, discovery responses do not constitute responsive pleadings and
are therefore insufficient to establish a waiver.80
72. A.R. Int'l, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (citing Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457
(9th Cir. 1995)); see also Inversora Murten, S.A. v. Energoprojekt Holding Co., 671
F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic
of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1161 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
73. A.R. Int'l, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 94 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1996)).
74. Seachem v. Cont'l de Petrols et Investments SA, 613 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
75. A.R. Int'l, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Ghawanmeh v. Islamic Saudi Acad., 672 F. Supp. 2d 3, 10 (D.D.C. 2009).
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B. COMMERCIAL Acrivrry-§ 1605(A)(2)
With the ongoing globalization of business and the increased involve-
ment of governments in commercial affairs, the "commercial activity" ex-
ception of the FSIA continues to be "the most significant of the FSIA's
exceptions" invoked as a basis for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns.8 1 This exception to foreign sovereign immunity pro-
vides that a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts in any case:
in which the action is based [(1)] upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or [(2)] upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [(3)] upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activ-
ity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States.82
In 2009, the courts applied the commercial activity exception conserva-
tively, often declining to exercise jurisdiction in close cases. Courts up-
held the immunity of states and their agents in cases ranging from private
military services contracts, to a diplomat's hiring of domestic servants, to
a charitable public entity's charging of fees for its services.8 3
1. What Acts Are Considered Commercial?
In distinguishing between commercial and sovereign acts, the FSIA ex-
pressly requires that acts be defined by their nature, not their purpose.84
For example, the act of hiring a real estate broker to locate and secure a
building may be commercial in nature, and therefore falls within the ex-
ception, even if the broker was hired for the seemingly sovereign purpose
of securing a Consulate building.85 In drawing the line between commer-
cial and sovereign acts, courts in 2009 looked to the standard established
by the Supreme Court in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, which instructs that the
commercial activity exception should apply "when a state 'exercises only
those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens' as distinct
from those 'powers peculiar to sovereigns.'"
8 6
81. See Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992)); Energy Allied Int'l Corp. v. Petroleum Oil & Gas
Corp. of South Africa, No. H-08-2387, 2009 WL 2923035, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 4,
2009).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
83. See generally Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509; Dabiri v. Fed'n of States Med. Bds. of
the U.S., Inc., No. 08-CV-4718, 2009 WL 803126 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009); Heroth
v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 331 F. App'x at *1 (D.D.C. 2009), affg 565 F. Supp.
2d 59 (D.D.C. 2008).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
85. See Box, 2009 WL 3163551 at *2-*3.
86. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993)), affd, 387 F. App'x 72 (2d Cir.
2010); see also O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2009) (discuss-
ing Nelson), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 361 (2009); Westfield v. Fed. Republic of Ger.,
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a. Contracts for Military Services
Two military contract cases reported in Crowell & Moring's The FSIA
Act: 2008 Year in Review met further scrutiny by the appellate courts in
2009.87 The outcomes of these cases highlight how nuanced differences
between contracts can have major implications in terms of sovereign
immunity.
In Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,88 a group of U.S. contractor
employees and their representatives brought suit against the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia for failing to provide adequate security at a residential com-
pound that was attacked by terrorists while the plaintiffs were living
there. The plaintiffs argued that Saudi Arabia was subject to jurisdiction
under the commercial activity exception to the FSIA because Saudi Ara-
bia had contracted business with the plaintiffs' employer-a U.S. com-
pany.89 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed and
affirmed the district court's holding that the Saudi Government's selec-
tion of a U.S. company to provide military training services under the
U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales ("FMS") program was a sover-
eign, non-commercial act. 90 The court of appeals cited its prior precedent
that "[w]hen two governments deal directly with each other as govern-
ments, even when the subject matter may relate to the commercial activi-
ties of its citizens. . .those dealings are not akin to that of participants in
the marketplace;" accordingly, the appellate court declined to extend the
commercial activity exception to exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia
in the case. 91
The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the provision of military training
services to a foreign military base would remain subject to the exception
if it had been brokered privately, i.e., outside of the FMS program, in
UNC Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.9 2 In UN Lear Ser-
vices, the Saudi Government hired an American company for two con-
tracts: (1) a maintenance contract to service and maintain its fleet of F-5
aircraft; and (2) a technical contract to provide training and support ser-
vices to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). 93 The district court had con-
cluded that the contracts were sufficiently similar to be treated as part of
the same transaction, and thus the commercial activity exception applied
to both because Saudi Arabia had ventured into the marketplace to con-
tract for these military maintenance and training services in the same
No. 3:09-0204, 2009 WL 2356554, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2009) (citing Nelson
test).
87. Aryeh S. Portnoy et al., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2008 Year-in-Re-
view, 16 LAw & Bus. REV. AM. 179, 188, 190 (2010).
88. Heroth, 331 F. App'x at *2
89. Id.
90. Id. at *3 (citing Cicippo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir.
1994)).
91. Id. at *2.
92. UNC Lear Servs., Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210, 215-17 (5th Cir.
2009).
93. Id. at 212-13.
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manner as would a private party.94
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that the two contracts were distinct
and had to be considered separately.95 With respect to the maintenance
contract, the court upheld jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia, finding that the
Kingdom "entered the marketplace to obtain repair services. . .for its F-5
aircraft" and that the military purpose of the contract "does not take the
transaction outside of the 'commercial' exception to sovereign immu-
nity."96 The court, however, reached the opposite conclusion (and re-
versed the district court's decision) with respect to the technical services
contract.97 The appellate court found it significant that the contractors
under the technical services contract were formally integrated into the
RSAF to provide flight operations services and training. 98 Thus,
"[u]nlike a contract to buy army boots or bullets.. .[this] was a contract to
provide personnel that were vital to the operation of a national air de-
fense system." 99 The court emphasized that the contract was sovereign in
both its purpose and its nature: "The legislative history from the FSIA
instructs [that] 'the employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military
personnel is not commercial in nature." 00 Because the court concluded
that the employees under the technical contract were "integrated into the
RSAF and. . . [could] be considered military personnel," it found that
entering into the contract was a sovereign act and fell outside of the com-
mercial activity exception of the FSIA. 10'
b. Commercial Acts of Diplomats
A pair of cases in the District of Columbia and New York tested both
diplomatic and sovereign immunity in 2009 as Kuwait and its diplomats
defended multiple claims brought by domestic servants against their em-
ployers. Jurisdiction in both cases hinged on the question of whether the
hiring and employment of domestic servants was a commercial activity
and whether the servants were employees of the sovereign itself or of the
individual diplomats. 102
In Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 03 a live-in domestic servant for a Kuwaiti dip-
lomat in New York City, brought suit against the diplomat in his individ-
ual capacity for subjecting her to "slavery-like practices" (including
assault and sexual abuse) and violating labor laws. She also brought
94. Id. at 214.
95. Id. at 216.
96. Id. at 217 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d




100. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6614; Holden v. Canadian Consulate, 92 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1996)).
101. Id.
102. Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 623 F. Supp. 2d 93, 95 (D.D.C. 2009); Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d
at 511-12.
103. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 511-12.
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claims against Kuwait on the grounds that it both actively supported and
was vicariously liable for the diplomat's actions.104 The individual de-
fendants did not respond to the complaint and Kuwait moved to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. 05
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
the plaintiff summary judgment against her individual employers, but de-
nied her claims against Kuwait itself. 06
The court first noted that a diplomat acting in his official capacity typi-
cally is considered akin to an "agency or instrumentality" of the state and
is therefore protected under the FSIA.107 In this case, however, the dip-
lomat's alleged actions-forced labor, rape and trafficking-were not "of-
ficial" acts.' 08 They were private actions, beyond the scope of his official
responsibilities and therefore not protected. 109 Moreover, the plaintiff
was a servant at the diplomat's private home, and thus the court found
that her employment "bore no relationship to the functions of a diplo-
matic mission.""10 With respect to Kuwait, the court found a "critical"
distinction between employment by the sovereign of civil service person-
nel and employment by diplomats themselves of domestic servants or la-
borers.1"' The court took note of the plaintiff's allegations that Kuwait
had paid for the individual defendants' moving and living expenses,
owned the home where they lived, and reimbursed them for certain ex-
penses.112 Nevertheless, the court found that these allegations reflected
conduct "peculiar to sovereigns" and were "insufficient to establish that
Kuwait engaged in commercial activity."113 Thus, because the plaintiff
"failed to establish that Kuwait's actions," as opposed to the actions of
the individual defendants, "are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in trade and traffic or commerce," the exception did not
apply.114
In a similar suit against Kuwait, Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, a group of domes-
tic workers brought various labor law, trafficking, tort, and breach of con-
tract claims against their former employers-diplomats at the Kuwaiti
Embassy in Washington, D.C.-as well as against Kuwait itself."r5 All
defendants moved to dismiss the claims.11 6 In this case, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia reached the opposite conclusion of the
Swarna court with respect to the individual defendants, finding that "hir-
104. Id. at 512.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 522 (citing In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 81).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 520.
111. Id. at 524.
112. Id. at 525.
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis in original)
115. Sabbithi, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
116. Id.
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ing domestic employees is an activity incidental to the daily life of a diplo-
mat and his or her family and does not constitute commercial activity
outside a diplomat's official function."117 Because the plaintiffs failed to
serve Kuwait properly under § 1608 of the FSIA, the court did not ad-
dress whether Kuwait was entitled to immunity.118
c. Public Charitable Activity
One court addressed whether a government-sponsored charity falls
within the commercial activity exception." 9 In Dabiri v. Federation of
States Medical Boards of the United States, Inc., the plaintiff, Dr. Dabiri,
brought suit against the General Medical Council (GMC), a statutory en-
tity created by the British Parliament and registered as a charity in En-
gland, whose functions include keeping up-to-date registers of qualified
doctors, fostering good medical practice, and addressing concerns about
doctors whose fitness to practice medicine is in doubt.120 Dr. Dabiri
claimed that GMC improperly released information about his fitness to
practice medicine to U.S. entities, which, he claimed, prevented him from
securing a job or medical license in the United States.121 Dr. Dabiri ar-
gued that GMC engaged in commercial activities in the United Kingdom
by educating the general public about health issues, keeping registers of
doctors, and charging fees for its services.122 The U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York found Dr. Dabiri's allegations insuffi-
cient to support a finding of commercial activity given that GMC is a
public authority and a charitable organization. 1 2 3
d. Licensing Natural Resources
Courts have long held that licensing or authorizing the exploitation of
natural resources is a sovereign activity.124 In 2009, in RSM Product
Corp. v. Fridman, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York likewise held that Grenada was immune from suit for allegedly
breaching a contract by denying a company a license to conduct oil and
gas exploration off its country's coast.125 The court held that "while Gre-
nada may have spoken in commercial terms when it allegedly breached
the.. .[contract], this does not warrant application of the FSIA's commer-
cial activity exception, as the. . .[contract] was one that only a sovereign
could have made."126
117. Id. at 96.
118. For further discussion of service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608, see Section V (A), supra.




123. Id. at *3.
124. See, e.g., RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangl., 736 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir.
1984)) (emphasis added).
125. See id.
126. Id. (citations omitted).
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e. Government Takings of Private Propertyl 2 7
Is it commercial activity when a government takes an individual's prop-
erty and privately auctions it off for profit? This question was addressed
by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in West-
field v. Republic of Germany.128 In that case, the estate of Walter West-
field brought suit against Germany, alleging that the former Nazi regime
arrested Mr. Westfield, seized his vast art collection and sold it on the
private market to raise funds for the German government-a practice
common during the Nazi era.12 9 Because the German Government took
the art for the purpose of selling it on the private art market, the plaintiff
alleged that the government's acts were "in connection with" commercial
activity abroad and that they had a "direct effect in the United States
because the artwork was intended for immediate transfer to the United
States by Westfield [though] it did not reach the United States, and West-
field's relatives in the United States were deprived of his property."13 0
The court refused to exercise jurisdiction, finding that the case turned on
how the property was obtained, rather than how the government intended
to dispose of it.131 Thus, because the case was "based upon" an act that
could be taken only by a sovereign, either an expropriation or satisfaction
of a criminal penalty in connection with Mr. Westfield's prosecution, the
exception did not apply.132 Because the court found that no commercial
activity had taken place, it did not consider whether the deprivation of
property to Westfield's U.S. relatives constituted a "direct effect" in the
United States.133
2. What Acts Create a Sufficient Nexus with the United States?
Once an act has been deemed "commercial" under the FSIA, it still
must have a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with the United States to fall
within the commercial activity exception.134 A nexus can be established
in three ways: (1) the foreign sovereign conducts a commercial act in the
United States; (2) the sovereign conducts an act in the United States in
connection with commercial activity abroad; or (3) the sovereign acts
outside of the United States in connection with the state's commercial
activity but causes a "direct effect" in the United States.'35
127. Note: This section deals with the question whether government takings are
commercial activities under § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. For discussion of the
"takings" exception to the FSIA, § 1605(a)(3), see Section III (C), supra.
128. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554 at *2.
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. at *7.
132. Id.; See Edem v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., No. 08-cv-2597, 2009 WL 4639393, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (holding that an Ethiopian customs officer's alleged
seizure of $13,600 of cash was particularly sovereign in nature).
133. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554 at *7.
134. Id. at *3.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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a. Acts in the United States by foreign states
The first clause of the exception permits jurisdiction over commercial
acts carried out in the United States by foreign states. Because "a sover-
eign [state] cannot act except through individuals," 13 6 whether the excep-
tion applies on this basis often depends on whether the sovereign can be
bound by the acts of its agents in the United States. In general, courts
have responded that "the commercial activity exception may be invoked
against a foreign state only when its officials have actual authority." 37
The recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Allfreight Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise ana-
lyzed important considerations regarding this issue for parties transacting
business with foreign government agents in the United States.138 In that
case, Allfreight brought a breach of contract action against the sovereign-
owned Ethiopian Airlines (EAE).' 39 The contract in question had not
been officially approved by EAE's general counsel (as required by
EAE's policy), but had been signed on EAE's behalf by two company
officials who had produced a "Delegation of Authority," written on EAE
letterhead, authorizing them to enter into the contract.140 Although Allf-
reight knew nothing about the EAE's policy regarding contract approval,
the Fourth Circuit agreed with EAE that the contract was void and unen-
forceable. 141 Specifically, the court held that parties transacting with for-
eign sovereign agents have a strict affirmative duty to make sure that the
agents have actual authority to bind the sovereign.14 2 Thus, despite what
may have been an honest mistake, the contract was deemed void, and no
exception to immunity applied. 143
Another question that has arisen under this clause of the commercial
activity exception is whether the acts in the United States are sufficiently
related to the claims to "form the basis for the suit."14 4 In Alperin v.
Vatican Bank, a group of Holocaust survivors brought suit against the
Vatican Bank to recover property and profits that the Nazis had obtained
through genocidal acts, looting, and slave labor that were allegedly de-
posited in the Vatican Bank.145 The plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction was
proper over the Vatican Bank (a foreign sovereign entity) because an-
other defendant allegedly had used funds laundered by the Vatican Bank
136. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 84
(internal quotations omitted)).
137. See Allfreight Worldwide Cargo, Inc. v. Ethiopian Airlines Enter., 307 F. App'x.
721, 724 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the Fourth Circuit joined the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits in holding that only actual-as opposed to apparent-authority will suf-
fice to trigger the commercial activity exception to the FSIA).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 722.
140. Id. at 725.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 724.
143. Id. at 725.
144. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 360 F. App'x 847, 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2009).
145. Id.
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to establish publishing houses and other commercial activities in the
United States.146 Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that the Vatican Bank
had been able to store gold in the United States and trade it on U.S. stock
exchanges because its gold collection had been enhanced by the stolen
property.147 The court held that these alleged commercial activities in the
United States were "too tangentially related to. . .[the plaintiffs'] legal
claims to be considered 'the basis for [the] suit.' "148
b. Acts in the United States in connection with commercial activity
abroad
The second clause of the commercial activity exception provides for
jurisdiction where the foreign sovereign performs acts in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity abroad.149 As with the
first clause of the commercial activity exception, for the exception to ap-
ply, the act in the United States must be not only "in connection with"
the commercial activity of the foreign state, but also must be sufficient to
form the basis of the suit itself.15 In other words, if the foreign state's
acts in the United States are unrelated to the cause of action, such acts
cannot confer jurisdiction under the exception.151
c. Acts outside the United States that cause a "direct effect" in the
United States
The third clause of the commercial activities exception grants U.S.
courts jurisdiction over commercial acts that occur outside the United
States, but which cause a "direct effect" in the United States. 52 Because
Congress provided no guidance as to what constitutes a "direct effect" in
the United States, this clause tends to generate substantial litigation par-
ticularly regarding the strength of the "direct effect" necessary to bring
an act within the exception. 53 This was true in 2009, when courts contin-
ued to struggle to establish clearly-defined boundaries under this




148. Id. The court further held that the "cumulative impact of ... [the plaintiffs' gold
on the Bank's] holdings and on its commercial activities in the United States over a
decade later; and the results of another party allegedly investing laundered funds
in Chicago" were insufficiently "direct" to confer jurisdiction. Id.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
150. See Heroth, 331 F. App'x. at 1 (finding defendant's actions of recruiting employees
in U.S. insufficient to form basis of "failure to warn" cause of action because actual
failure to warn occurred outside U.S.).
151. Id.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
153. See e.g., Pons v. People's Republic of China, 666 F. Supp. 2d 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
See Energy Allied Int'l Corp. v. PetroSA, No. H-08-2387, 2009 WL 2923035 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 4, 2009).
154. See Pons, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 406; see generally Energy Allied, 2009 WL 2923035.
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Financial Hardship or Loss Felt in the United States: Direct Effect?:
Courts historically have viewed with skepticism the argument that the
mere financial loss by an American citizen or company constitutes a "di-
rect effect" sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign de-
fendant. In 2009, the courts generally upheld this principle. 55 For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
in Pons v. People's Republic of China, considered whether there is a "di-
rect effect" in the United States when a sovereign defendant defaults on a
bond that was negotiated, consummated and payable outside of the
United States, causing financial injury to U.S. after-market bond purchas-
ers. 156 The court held that there was no jurisdiction over the sovereign
defendant, noting that the bonds called for payment in any of five loca-
tions, all outside of the United States.157 The court also rejected the argu-
ment that the voluntary tender of interest payments in the United States
created a "direct effect," finding that the relevant place of performance is
where such performance can be demanded, not where it is voluntarily
made.' 58 The court concluded that "Congress did not intend to provide
jurisdiction whenever the ripples caused by an overseas transaction man-
age eventually to reach the shores of the United States."' 59
In Energy Allied International Corp. v. PetroSA, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas similarly held that financial hardship
suffered in the United States was an insufficient "direct effect."1 6 0 In that
case, a U.S. corporation entered into a joint venture with a South African
government entity, PetroSA, to exploit certain oil concessions in
Egypt.161 After the companies jointly submitted the winning bid to the
Egyptian authorities, PetroSA's board decided not to invest in the pro-
ject, allegedly leaving the U.S. corporation in the lurch, with a damaged
reputation, no time to find a new partner, and a lost business opportu-
nity.162 The court did not find any of these alleged harmful effects to
constitute a "direct effect" in the United States.163 Specifically, with re-
spect to the plaintiff's claim that the lost potential business opportunity
directly caused the U.S. company to experience financial harm, the court
noted that financial hardship "is too vague a basis for a direct effect," and
noted that "[t]he focus of extant jurisprudence has been on the breach of
155. See Pons, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
156. Id. at 409.
157. Id. at 413.
158. Id. at 413. The court also discouraged parties from resting too heavily on the
United States' role as an international financial center to establish jurisdiction,
stating that, "[t]hough the United States enjoys the status of being a world finan-
cial center, the FSIA was not meant to make its courts as open as its markets." Id.
159. Id. at 412 (citing United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33
F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 1994); Virtual Countries v. Republic of S. Afr., 300 F.3d
230, 236-237 (2d Cir. 2002)).
160. Energy Allied, 2009 WL 2923035 at *1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id. at *5.
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performance due in the United States." 164
While most courts have accepted the principle that financial or business
loss alone is insufficient to create a "direct effect" under the FSIA, the
limits of this rule are still being tested.165 This was demonstrated in early
2010, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned a
2009 district court decision, which had recognized sovereign immunity
where plaintiff had alleged that the sovereign's conduct had caused finan-
cial harm to the U.S. parties. 166 The court of appeals found that the busi-
ness loss sustained by the U.S. company as a result of the alleged breach
constituted a "direct effect in the United States." 167 In Cruise Connec-
tions Charter Management, a North Carolina company sued certain Cana-
dian government agencies for breach of contract, relating to boat charter
services for the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver.168 Pursuant to the
contract with Canada, Cruise Connections was required to subcontract
with two U.S. boat operators to use their vessels. 169 Yet, before any of
those contracts could be performed, Canada allegedly altered the terms
of the arrangement, causing the U.S. companies to back out, which, in
turn, led to the termination of the underlying contract.170 Although the
contract with Canada was executed, to be performed, and allegedly
breached in Canada, the plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction in the United
States based on the commercial activity exception because (1) Canada's
actions caused Cruise Connections, and third-party U.S. boat operators
with whom it had contracted, to lose U.S. business; and (2) the contract
allegedly required the Canadian entities to pay Cruise Connections via
wire transfer to a U.S. bank and therefore caused a "direct effect in the
United States."''
The district court rejected the first argument, adhering to the long-
standing rule that "mere financial loss by an American individual or com-
pany does not constitute a 'direct effect' in the United States," and
finding that Cruise Connection's inability to perform its contractual obli-
gations to the third parties constituted an intervening element between
Canada's breach and the broken third-party agreements.172 The court
also rejected Cruise Connection's second argument, finding no evidence
that payment was required in the United States.173
On appeal, the U. S. Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Canada's
termination of the contract had a direct effect in the United States be-
cause, as a result of Canada's acts, "the U.S. company [was] unable to
164. Id. at *4.
165. See Cruise Connections Charter Mgrnt, LLP v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 634 F. Supp.
2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 600 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
166. Cruise Connections, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 87.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 90.
172. Id. at 88.
173. Id. at 89.
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consummate fully negotiated, multi-million-dollar subcontracts with U.S.-
based cruise lines to provide the necessary ships." 1 7 4 Thus, because "the
alleged breach resulted in the direct loss of millions of dollars worth of
business in the United States," the appellate court found a direct effect in
the United States sufficient to confer jurisdiction."'
Nonpayment to a U.S. Bank Account: Many plaintiffs have argued that
the failure to make payment in the United States under a contract causes
a "direct effect" in the United States sufficient to confer jurisdiction
under the FSIA, even where all other relevant acts took place abroad.176
Courts have required in such cases that the plaintiff make a strong show-
ing that the United States was the required or intended place of payment
(not merely an available option). In the lower court's decision in Cruise
Connections, the district court helped to clarify this standard, identifying
four scenarios set out in the case law where payment (or nonpayment)
through U.S. bank accounts constitutes a direct effect in the United
States:177
(1) the contract expressly designates an American location as the place
of payment;
(2) the contract allows the payee to designate a place of payment, and
an American location is designated;178
(3) the contract is silent on payment location, but the payee asks and
the payer agrees to pay at an American location;179 and
(4) the contract is silent on payment location, but there is a longstand-
ing consistent customary practice between the parties of payment
at an American location.180
The court also provided additional guidance regarding how "express"
the designation of a U.S. payment location must be before it is deemed
sufficient to support jurisdiction against the sovereign.18 Specifically, the
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the requirement that the Ca-
nadian entities pay the U.S.-located charter company by "direct pay-
ment" was sufficient to demonstrate a "direct effect" in the United
States.182 Nor was it sufficient to allege simply that the payee had se-
lected a U.S. bank account to receive payment. 183 Rather, the court held
that for the exception to apply the parties must have agreed, expressly or
impliedly, that payment would occur in the United States.184
174. Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 662.
175. Id. at 666.
176. Cruise Connections, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
177. Id. at 88.
178. Id. (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
179. Id. (citing IT. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 351 F.3d 1184 (D.C.
Cir. 2003)).
180. Id. at 88 (citing Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Wald, J., concurring)).
181. Id. at 88-89.
182. Id. at 90.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 88-89.
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Payment from a U.S. Bank Account: In Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat
Bankasi, A.S., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York addressed the reverse question, i.e., whether the failure to make a
payment from a U.S. bank account creates a direct effect in the United
States185 The court held that such a failure is insufficient to confer juris-
diction.186 Rather, the court applied a "legally significant act" test, under
which the plaintiff must demonstrate a legally significant act in the
United States by the defendant sovereign, e.g., a requirement that money
be deposited or that credit documents be presented in the United
States.187 In short, the court held that the fact that money was withdrawn
from a U.S. account, as opposed to a bank located elsewhere, was entirely
fortuitous, and insufficient to subject a foreign sovereign to U.S.
jurisdiction.18 8
C. TAKINGS-§ 1605(A)(3)
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit, in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, issued a
significant decision addressing the FSIA's "takings exception" that pro-
vides important guidance for parties hoping to invoke this exception in
the future.189 The takings exception permits jurisdiction over a foreign
state in any case:
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are
in issue and [either (1)] that property or any property exchanged for
such property is present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or [(2)] that property or any property exchanged for such prop-
erty is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the for-
eign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States. 190
185. Guirlando v. T.C Ziraat Bankasi, A.S., No. 07 Civ. 10266, 2009 WL 159705, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2009), denying reconsideration of Guirlando v. TC. Ziraat
Bankasi, A.S., No. 07 Civ. 10266, 2008 WL 5272195 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008).
186. Id. at *3.
187. Id. at *2-3.
188. Id.; see also Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 34 (2d
Cir. 1993). In Antares Aircraft, the plaintiff sued for damages relating to the de-
tention, damage, and conversion of its aircraft-all of which happened in Nigeria.
Id. at 34. The plaintiff argued that it paid to the defendants from its bank account
in New York certain fees related to this action, thus creating a "direct effect" in the
United States for FSIA purposes. Id. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding that
this act was "without legal significance." Id. at 36.
189. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). See also Garb v. Republic of Pol., 440 F.3d 579, 588 (2d
Cir. 2006) (outlining four elements necessary to satisfy the "takings exception":
"(1) that rights in property are at issue; (2) that the property was taken; (3) that
the taking was in violation of international law; and either (4)(a) 'that property ...
is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state', or (4)(b) 'that property . . . is owned or
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States."') (quot-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)).
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1. Scope of the Exception
In Cassirer, the plaintiff brought suit against the Kingdom of Spain
(Spain) and the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation ("Founda-
tion") to recover a painting located in the Foundation's museum in Ma-
drid.191 The plaintiff alleged that the painting originally had belonged to
his grandmother and that the Nazis had stolen it from her in 1939, in
violation of international law.192 Over the years the painting was bought
and sold several times until it finally became part of the Foundation's
collection under Spain's ownership.193
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the question whether the takings ex-
ception applies where the defendant was not the original sovereign entity
that expropriated the property.194 Both parties agreed that it was Ger-
many, not Spain, that had originally taken the painting from the plaintiff's
grandmother. 195 The defendants argued that the court should read into
the exception a requirement that only the expropriating state can lose its
immunity from suit.196 The court rejected the defendants' argument.197
Specifically, the court focused on the statute's use of the passive voice in
providing an exception to immunity for any case "in which rights in prop-
erty taken in violation of international law are in issue."198 The court
found the language to be unambiguous in allowing claims against foreign
states that did not themselves expropriate the property.199
2. More "Commercial Activity" Analysis
Like the FSIA's "commercial activity" exception, the takings exception
requires a commercial nexus between the United States and either the
property at issue in the claim or the foreign state actor itself.200 As dis-
cussed above, the FSIA defines a commercial activity as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act." 201 Other courts have put it this way: to determine whether a given
activity was "commercial" within the meaning of this provision, "[t]he
central question is whether the activity is of a kind in which a private
party might engage." 202
In Cassirer, the Ninth Circuit held that the Foundation had engaged in
commercial activity in the United States "of a kind in which a private
191. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1022.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1023.
194. See id. at 1028.
195. Id. at 1022.
196. See id. at 1028.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1027-28 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)) (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 1029.
200. See § 1605(a)(3).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
202. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d
699, 708 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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party might engage." 203 Specifically, the court found that the Foundation
had, inter alia, made numerous purchases of books, posters, post cards,
and related materials from businesses in the United States, sold posters
and books to U.S. residents and businesses, and shipped items to purchas-
ers in the United States. 204 The Foundation even sold a poster of the
painting at issue in the case to individuals in the United States and pur-
chased books about Nazi expropriation from Amazon.com and the
American Association of Museums in Washington, D.C.2 0 5 Based on this
evidence, the court held that the defendants had engaged in commercial
activity in the United States sufficient to satisfy § 1605(a)(3). 206
3. Exhaustion
One final twist in the Cassirer decision relates to the defendants' argu-
ment that the plaintiff was required to exhaust local remedies before it
could pursue an action under the FSIA. 2 0 7 The district court had held
that the plain language of the FSIA contains no such requirement and
refused to impose one in the case.208 The three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit recognized that the FSIA contains no express exhaustion require-
ment, but remanded for the district court to determine whether a "pru-
dential" exhaustion requirement was warranted in the case.209 But, in
2010, a majority of the en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit ended the de-
bate (for the time being), agreeing with the district court that no statutory
exhaustion requirement exists under the FSIA and finding that any "pru-
dential" arguments for exhaustion were not before the court and there-
fore were outside the appellate court's "present jurisdiction." 2 10
D. NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS-§ 1605(A)(5)
The "non-commercial tort" or "tortious activity" exception removes a
sovereign defendant's immunity for acts:
(1) occurring in the United States; (2) caused by [a] tortious act or
omission; (3) where the alleged acts or omissions were those of a
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state; and
(4) those acts or omissions were done within the scope of tortfeasor's
employment. 211
203. Id. at 1037.
204. Id. at 1032.
205. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1058 n.13 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated,
590 F.3d 981, (9th Cir. 2009).
206. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1033-34.
207. Id. at 1034.
208. Id.
209. Cassirer, 580 F.3d at 1059-64.
210. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1037.
211. O'Bryan, 556 F.3d at 380-81 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)) (internal quotations
omitted).
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When analyzing these elements, courts generally apply the substantive
law of the state in which the act took place.212
The Act, however, sets forth two statutory carve-outs to the exception.
First, the exception does not apply where the claim is based on the exer-
cise or performance of (or failure to perform) a "discretionary func-
tion."2 1 3 Second, the exception does not apply to claims "arising out of
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contractual rights." 214
In 2009, there were two developments relating to the non-commercial
torts exception. First, the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of the discre-
tionary function exception.215 Second, Congress proposed a bill to
amend § 1605(a)(5) to encompass terrorist activity.2 1 6
1. Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception.
A foreign sovereign is immune from suit if it can successfully establish
that the tort claims are "based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused." 217 Courts have held that a foreign
sovereign retains its immunity if the challenged action is: "(1) discretion-
ary in nature or involve[s] an element of judgment and choice and (2) the
judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was de-
signed to shield" 218-that is, "whether the choice or judgment was one
involving social, economic or political policy." 2 1 9
In Doe v. Holy See, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the tortious
activity exception should be applied to claims for negligent retention, su-
pervision, and failure to warn, filed against the Holy See by the alleged
victims of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic priests. 220 The court held that
the actions at issue were discretionary functions, thus, the Holy See re-
tained its sovereign immunity.221 The Court noted that the key question
212. See id. at 381 (applying Kentucky law to the four elements of the tortious act ex-
ception). Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Oregon
law to determine whether the tortfeasor's actions were "within the scope of em-
ployment"). The Supreme Court has invited the Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the views of the United States in Doe. Holy See v. Doe, 130 S. Ct. 659
(Nov. 16, 2009). Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26 (applying New York law to
determine whether the tortfeasor's actions were "within the scope of
employment").
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
214. Id. §1605(a)(5)(B).
215. See O'Bryan, 556 F.3d at 383-84; Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083-84; Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d
at 526-27.
216. S. 2930 § 3(a)(1)(B).
217. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1083.
218. Id. at 1083-84 (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)) (internal
quotations omitted).
219. O'Bryan, 556 F.3d at 384 (quoting Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 949 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
220. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1069.
221. Id. at 1083-85. The court found that the Holy See could still be liable for Doe's
respondeat superior claim. Id.
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is not whether the sovereign's actions were "grounded in policy consider-
ations," but rather whether a foreign state's decision is "susceptible to a
policy analysis," i.e. "one that implements political, social and economic
judgments."2 2 2 Ultimately, because "social, economic, or political policy
considerations" could have influenced the Holy See's decisions, 2 2 3 the
court held that the Holy See's decision was "the kind of judgment that
the discretionary function exception was designed to shield." 2 2 4
2. Proposed Amendment Encompassing Terrorism
In 2009, Senator Specter proposed the Justice Against Sponsors of Ter-
rorism Act, a law that would allow victims of terrorism to sue foreign
states for damages resulting from attacks on U.S. soil.225 Unlike the
"state sponsorship" of terrorism provision set out in §1605A, the defen-
dant sovereign need not be on the U.S. Department of State's "state
sponsor" of terrorism list. Rather any country that provides material sup-
port for a terrorist attack on U.S. soil would be stripped of immunity and
subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts. 2 2 6
The Act purports to overturn the Second Circuit's decision in In re
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,227 in which the court dismissed
claims by victims of the September 11, 2001, attacks that alleged that the
Saudi Arabian Government played a role in the attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon.228 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the claims fell squarely within the commercial tort exception, holding
that the state sponsorship of terrorism was the exclusive means of assert-
ing a claim against a foreign state for material support of a terrorist act. 2 2 9
Because Saudi Arabia has never been designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism, the Court held that it is immune from suits alleging terrorist-
related acts. 230
The proposed Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, sponsored by
Senator Arlen Specter, declared that the Second Circuit's decision
undermine[s] important counter-terrorism policies of the United
States, by affording undue protection from civil liability to persons,
entities and states that provide material support or resources to for-
eign terrorist organizations, and by depriving victims of international
terrorism of meaningful access to court to seek redress for their
injuries. 231
As Senator Specter explained, the Act's
222. Id. at 1085 (quoting Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001);
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. S. 2930 § 3(a)(1)(B).
226. Id.
227. Id. § 2(a)(7).
228. In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 75-76.
229. Id. at 87-89.
230. Id. at 89.
231. S. 2930 § 2(a)(7).
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main provisions would [have] amend[ed] FSIA to make clear that, as
Congress originally intended, a foreign state may be sued under the
torts exception if it sponsors terrorists who commit terrorist attacks
on our soil, without regard to whether it is a state-designated sponsor
of terrorism. 232
Specifically, the Act would amend § 1605(a)(5) to apply
regardless of where the underlying tortious act or omission is com-
mitted, and to include without limitation any tort claim in relation to
an act of extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, ter-
rorism, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined
in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act.2 3 3
The Act would have applied retroactively, such that pending actions
relying on § 1605(a)(5) would benefit from the amendment upon motion,
and claims dismissed on the grounds that the exception did not apply to
terrorism would be reinstated. 234 No action was taken in this bill during
the 111th Congress; it is unclear whether a similar provision will be rein-
troduced in the 112th Congress.
E. ARBITRATION-§ 1605(A)(6)
U.S. courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA to enforce against a for-
eign sovereign an agreement to arbitrate, or to confirm an award made
pursuant to such an agreement, in two circumstances: (1) where "the ar-
bitration takes place or is intended to take place in the United States";
and (2) where "the agreement or award is. . .governed by a treaty or
other international agreement . . . calling for the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards." 235 No notable cases arose under the "arbitra-
tion exception" in 2009.
F. TERRORISM-§ 1605A, § 1605 (A)(7), AND OTHER CLAIMS
In 2009, courts addressed the amendments to the "terrorism excep-
tion," which were enacted in 2008 as part of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA). 236 The amendments
replaced § 1605(a)(7) of FSIA with the new "terrorism exception," codi-
fied at § 1605A. 2 3 7 Under both § 1605(a)(7) and the new provision,
§ 1605A, foreign states designated by the U.S. Department of State as
''state sponsors" of terrorism (and their agencies and instrumentalities)
are stripped of sovereign immunity for certain terrorist acts as long as the
state is designated as a "state sponsor of terrorism" at the time of the
terrorist act or at some later time as a result of the act which is the subject
232. 155 Cong. Rec. S13886 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter).
233. S. 2930 § 3(a)(1)(B).
234. Id. H§ 3(b)-(d).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
236. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1605A, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44 [hereinafter NDAA].
237. See id.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
of the suit.2 3 8 For defendants' conduct to fall within this exception, they
must have participated in an "act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, [or] hostage taking" or provided "material support or resources
for such . . . act[s]." 239 Plaintiffs also must prove causation and dam-
ages. 240 Among the most significant recent changes to the "terrorism"
provisions of the FSIA, the statute now (a) expressly provides plaintiffs
with a federal statutory cause of action against state sponsors of terror-
ism; 2 4 1 and (b) allows plaintiffs to seek punitive damages against foreign
sovereigns.242
1. Implementation of § 1605A
a. New Federal Statutory Cause of Action
Perhaps the most notable of the new "terrorism" amendments is the
provision establishing a federal statutory cause of action. 243 Before en-
actment of the 2008 NDAA, plaintiffs were required to assert their claims
under state law, which, in many cases, resulted in a lack of uniformity
among judgments and "significant disparities with respect to the availabil-
ity of relief for similarly situated plaintiffs." 2 4 4 In 2009, courts clarified
the elements of the new federal private cause of action by "rely[ing] on
well-established principles of law, such as those found in Restatement
(Second) of Torts and other leading treatises, as well as those principles
that have been adopted by the majority of state jurisdictions." 24 5
One case provided a clear demonstration of how the new federal statu-
tory cause of action increased plaintiffs' ability to recover. In Estate of
Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress
had been rejected as impermissible under applicable state law.2 4 6 Al-
lowing plaintiffs to proceed under § 1605(c), the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia applied § 1605A and allowed claims for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.247
b. Punitive Damages
Section 1605A allows plaintiffs to recover punitive damages against
238. NDAA § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Currently, that list consists of Cuba, Iran, Sudan,
and Syria. Countries that were once on the list but have since been removed in-
clude Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, South Yemen, and Libya. State Sponsors of
Terrorism, U.S. DEVI. S-rATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/cl4l5l.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2010).
239. NDAA § 1605A(a)(1).




244. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 77 (D.D.C.
2009).
245. Id. at 61; see also Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20,
23-24 (D.D.C. 2009).
246. Heiser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
247. Id. at 25-26.
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state sponsors of terrorism. 2 4 8 In 2009, two courts issued judgments
against Iran for punitive damages, for its role in the 1984 bombing of the
U.S. Embassy in Lebanon that killed fourteen people and wounded
thirty-five, 249 and the 1996 bombing of a residential complex on a U.S.
military base in Saudi Arabia that killed nineteen members of the Air
Force.250 In each case, the court awarded plaintiffs $300 million in puni-
tive damages, on the basis that the sum is triple the amount of Iran's
annual expenditure on terrorism. 251
c. Limitations on New § 1605A Claims
Section 1605A does not automatically apply to claims pending before
courts under § 1605(a)(7). 252 Rather, § 1083(c) of the NDAA provides
that pending claims relying upon § 1605(a)(7) could "be given effect as if
the action had originally been filed under § 1605A(c)," if the claims were
re-filed within sixty days of the enactment of § 1605A.2 5 3 The amend-
ments also allow plaintiffs to file "new" claims that are "related" to a
prior action-i.e., arise from the same act or incident-that was timely
brought under § 1605(a)(7). 254 Related actions are also subject to the
same sixty-day time limit for filing and thus must have been filed by
March 28, 2008.255
There has been a great deal of confusion about the retroactivity provi-
sions. In the consolidated actions In re Iran Terrorism Litigation, some
plaintiffs with pending § 1605(a)(7) claims filed new claims as "related
actions,"256 while others filed a motion to "give effect" under
§ 1083(c)(2) in their pending cases.257 Several others used the "belt and
suspenders" approach of bringing claims under both §§ 1083(c)(2) and
(c)(3). 258 In most cases, the court permitted the claims to go forward as
long as plaintiffs complied with the sixty-day filing requirement.259 The
court observed that many plaintiffs had been dealing with-"a good deal
of confusion regarding how parties should avail themselves of the bene-
fits of the new statute" since its enactment. 260
248. NDAA § 1605A(c).
249. Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2009).
250. Heiser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
251. Id. at 30-31; Brewer, 664 F. Supp. at 58-59.
252. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1191-1192 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Gates v.
Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F. Supp. 2d 79, 89-90 (D.D.C. 2009).
253. NDAA, § 1083(c)(2).
254. Id. § 1083(c)(3).
255. Baumel v. Syrian Arab Republic, 667 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1083(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
256. In re Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
257. Id. at 99.
258. Id. at 91.
259. See generally id. at 92-100.
260. Id. at 67.
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d. Constitutionality
As courts apply this new statutory scheme, many constitutional con-
cerns have emerged, but so far, the NDAA and § 1605A have withstood
constitutional scrutiny. In Rux v. Republic of Sudan, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected an argument that the
amendments to the terrorism exception violate the Equal Protection
Clause because they create arbitrary distinctions "depending on when
and how a particular plaintiff files suit." 2 6 1 The plaintiffs in Rux had been
barred from amending their complaints to add a § 1605A claim because
their original claim had not "relied upon § 1605(a)(7)." 262
The Rux court found that the plaintiffs could have timely brought a
new "related action" pursuant to § 1083(c)(3). 263 It further found that
the distinction between the plaintiffs and those who could amend their
complaints because their initial complaint had relied on § 1605(a)(7) sur-
vived "rational basis" review. 264 The court reasoned that, unlike claim-
ants who had originally relied on § 1605(a)(7), the plaintiffs who did not
assert a federal cause of action could have already secured a judgment
under state law or federal statutory law pursuant to the pass-through pro-
vision set forth in § 1606.265 Indeed, some of the plaintiffs in Rux had
secured a monetary judgment under the Death on the High Seas Act. 2 6 6
Furthermore, the court noted that allowing plaintiffs who already had ob-
tained judgment to add a new cause of action to their complaints would
raise constitutional and procedural issues. 267
A larger constitutional concern has stemmed from challenges based on
the separation of powers doctrine. The Rux court cautioned that separa-
tion-of-powers issues "lurked" because the NDAA "undermines the in-
dependence of the Article III courts and the finality of their decisions" by
requiring federal courts to reopen final judgments in certain cases. 268 The
court in the Iran Terrorism Litigation expressed similar concerns that
"this enactment offends deeply entrenched constitutional principles relat-
ing to the separation of powers and the ability of the judiciary to function
independently without interference from the political process." 269 None-
theless, because § 1605A is "a fundamentally different law" than
§ 1605(a)(7), and because of the unique context of FSIA, that court
found that "§ 1083(c)(3) does not direct the reopening of final judgments
in violation of Article III," and accordingly "the waiver of res judicata
and collateral estoppel in § 1083(c)(2)(B) should also withstand constitu-
261. Rux v. Republic Of Sudan, 672 F. Supp. 2d 726, 737 (E.D. Va. 2009).
262. Id. at 727.
263. Id. at 736-737.
264. Id. at 737.
265. Id. at 731.
266. Id. at 729-730.
267. Id. at 737.
268. Rux, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
269. In re Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69.
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tional scrutiny under the narrow facts of these cases." 270 The court also
suggested that the NDAA does not raise due process concerns, because
foreign states do not have due process rights. 271
2. Call to Action: District Court Takes on the NDAA and FSIA
In addition to addressing the NDAA's sixty-day limitation and the con-
stitutional concerns implicated by the statute, In re Iran Terrorism Litiga-
tion addressed multiple issues raised by the new legislation and the FSIA
generally.272 In a 190-page decision, Judge Lamberth of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia criticized the "terrorism exception,"
concluding: "Civil litigation against Iran under the FSIA state sponsor of
terrorism exception represents a failed policy."27 3
The court's criticisms centered around plaintiffs' struggle to obtain any
actual relief against Iran because of the difficulty of locating and ob-
taining Iranian assets. 274 The court lamented the inequitable result
whereby victims with more powerful advocates had won races to the
courthouse and to Congress to obtain funds under the Victims of Traffick-
ing and Violence Protection Act of 2000.275 The court also noted that
FSIA's interference with the president's foreign policy prerogatives had
placed victims of terrorism in the middle of a political battle, turning
courts into "powerless and frustrated bystander[s]" that have expended
judicial resources to address complex questions of law without any real
results for victims. 2 7 6 As a result, the court called for Congress and the
President to place these claims before a claims commission, and invited
the government to participate in the consolidated action before it.277
3. Dismissal of Claims Against Specific Nations
a. Iraq
In 2003, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, Congress
passed the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (EW-
SAA), 278 which in § 1503 authorized the President to make FSIA's
§ 1605(a)(7) "inapplicable" to Iraq.279 The President later exercised this
waiver authority and restored Iraq's sovereign immunity.280 Nonetheless,
in the 2004 case Acree v. Republic of Iraq,281 the D.C. Circuit held that
the President's EWSAA authority did not permit him to waive
270. Id. at 77, 81.
271. Id. at 86-88.
272. See generally, In re Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
273. Id. at 37.
274. Id. at 41, 124.
275. Id. at 56-57, 124 (citing Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1541 (2000)).
276. Id. at 127.
277. Id. at 131-135.
278. See generally Pub. L. No. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559 (2003).
279. Id. § 1503.
280. Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2187 (2009) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 26459).
281. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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§ 1605(a)(7) for claims arising out of acts Iraq had taken while designated
as a sponsor of terrorism. 2 8 2 While acknowledging that it was "an ex-
ceedingly close question," 283 the court held that "[t]here is nothing in the
language of § 1503, the EWSAA as a whole, or its legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended by this statute to alter the jurisdiction of
the federal courts under the FSIA."28
The 2008 NDAA again gave the president waiver authority with re-
spect to Iraq,2 8 5 which he subsequently exercised by waiving "all provi-
sions of section 1083 of the Act with respect to Iraq," thereby preserving
Iraq's immunity from suit in U.S. courts.286 Although Congress also had
inserted a provision purporting to ratify Acree by providing that nothing
in the EWSAA divested the courts' jurisdiction under FSIA,2 8 7 the Su-
preme Court in the 2009 case Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, unanimously
overturned Acree and held that the President's exercise of his waiver au-
thority under the NDAA as to Iraq restored its immunity from suit for
actions brought under FSIA's terrorism exception. 288 The Court em-
ployed what it considered to be a straightforward application of the EW-
SAA's language and held that once the President waived the application
of § 1605(a)(7) to Iraq, courts lost jurisdiction over all pending cases
against Iraq.289 The Court further held that the new Presidential waiver,
pursuant to the NDAA, waived all provisions of the NDAA as to Iraq,
including those that purport to ratify the D.C. Circuit's decision in
A cree.290
b. Libya
In 2008, the United States accepted a $1.5 billion payment from Libya
as a resolution of all claims brought by victims of Libya-sponsored terror-
ism and removed Libya from the "state sponsor" of terrorism list.291
Congress likewise passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, which
divested courts of jurisdiction over these claims and authorized the State
Department to designate procedures for providing fair compensation.292
In 2009, certain plaintiffs objected to the dismissal of their terrorism-
related claims against Libya in federal court on the basis that the State
Department's procedures provided inadequate compensation, thus, plain-
tiffs suffered an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. 293
282. Id. at 48.
283. Id. at 51.
284. Id. at 57.
285. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. at 2187 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1083(d)).
286. Id. at 2188 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 6571 (2008)).
287. Id. at 2187 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1083(c)(4)).
288. Id. at 2189.
289. Id. at 2190-91, 2194.
290. Id. at 2192.
291. Harris v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.
2009).
292. Libyan Claims Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 110-301, 122 Stat. 2999 (2008).
293. Harris, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 4; Clay v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 614
F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 2009).
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The courts rejected this argument, finding that a takings claim against the
United States, which was not a defendant in the case at hand, could not
alter the fact that the court was divested of jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
claims against Libyan state defendants. 2 9 4
G. COUNTERCLAIM-§ 1607
FSIA also bars a foreign state from claiming immunity with respect to
any counterclaim:
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under
section 1605 or 1605A. . .had such claim been brought in a separate
action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject mat-
ter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding
in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign
state. 295
In Reino de Espafia v. ABSG Consulting, Inc.,296 Spain sued defend-
ants ABSG Consulting, Inc. (ABS), under American general maritime
and Spanish law for damages resulting from the M. T. Prestige oil spill.
ABS filed counterclaims for indemnification and contribution relating to
liability for the same oil spill. 2 9 7 The Second Circuit held that Spain was
not entitled to immunity with respect to the defendants' counterclaim be-
cause, pursuant to § 1607(b), the counterclaims bore a "logical relation-
ship" to the subject matter of the affirmative claim raising "similar, if not
identical, issues of duty and causation." 298 The court found that the "re-
sult fully accords with the purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 1607(b): to prevent
a foreign sovereign from obtaining the benefit of litigating its claims in a
United States court while simultaneously avoiding liability for counter-
claims logically related to them." 299
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
FSIA also can be invoked to protect a foreign sovereign's property
from attachment or execution.300 But this protection is not absolute.
Section 1610 provides several limited exceptions to the immunity of a
foreign sovereign's assets from attachment.301 In 2009, the courts ad-
dressed two of these exceptions: the commercial activity exception and
294. Harris, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 4; Clay, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 24-25.
295. 28 U.S.C. § 1607.
296. Reino de Espafia v. ABSG Consulting, Inc., Nos. 08-0579-cv(L), 08-0754-cv(XAP),
2009 WL 1636122, at *1 (2d Cir. June 12, 2009).
297. Id. at *2.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
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the terrorism exception. 302
A. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY
FROM ATTACHMENT
A claimant must satisfy two elements to invoke the commercial activity
exception to a foreign sovereign's immunity from attachment: First, the
foreign state's property must be "property in the United States," and,
second, the property "must have been used for a commercial activity at
the time the writ of attachment or execution is issued."303
In Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, the Second
Circuit evaluated whether that the fact that the property of a foreign state
will or could potentially be used would satisfy the second element.304 The
court held that the foreign sovereign's property in the United States
"must be used for a commercial activity in the United States upon a judg-
ment entered by a court of the United States or of a State."305 In the
Aurelius case, the Republic of Argentina had "defaulted on payments on
debt instruments issued to bondholders." 306 As a result, the plaintiffs ob-
tained judgments against the Republic, but were then unable to recover
on these judgments.307 Later, in 2008, the President of Argentina decided
to integrate "private pension funds, held and managed on behalf of Ar-
gentine workers and pensioners," into the Republic's social security sys-
tem.3 0 8 The plaintiffs then brought suit against Argentina, seeking to
attach the money in these funds as recovery for the previously secured
judgments. 309 The Second Circuit held that "in the hands of the Repub-
lic," the property was not being used for a commercial activity. 3 10 More
specifically, the court held that "a sovereign's mere transfer to a govern-
mental entity of legal control over an asset does not qualify the property
as being 'used for a commercial activity.' "31' Thus, the court held that
the pension funds were immune from attachment.312
B. THE TERRORISM EXCEPTION: TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT
(TRIA) AND BLOCKED ASSETS
TRIA, enacted in 2002, permits terrorism victims with judgments under
§ 1605(a)(7) to satisfy their judgments for compensatory damages from
blocked assets of terrorists, terrorist organizations, and State sponsors of
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Aurelius Capital Partners, LP. v. Republic of Arg., 584 F.3d 120, 129-30 (2d Cir.
2009).
305. Id. at 130 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).




310. Id. at 131.
311. Id. at 131 (internal citations omitted).
312. Id.
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terrorism. 313
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ministry of Def & Support for the
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, addressed the ques-
tion whether a judgment against a U.S. company held by Iran was "a
'blocked asset"' as defined by the TRIA.3 1 4 The plaintiff sought to exe-
cute against a $2.8 million judgment that Iran had obtained against a Cali-
fornia company called Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. to satisfy a judgment
against Iran for compensatory damages arising under the terrorism ex-
ception to FSIA. 3 1 5 Iran argued that the asset was immune from attach-
ment, claiming that the judgment was not a "blocked asset" under
TRIA. 316
The Cubic Judgment arose out of a pre-1981 contract with Iran involv-
ing an air combat training system for Iran, but did not become an en-
forceable judgment until 1999, well after President Carter had blocked
virtually all Iranian assets following the Iran hostage crisis.317 The court
of appeals found that the President had never unblocked the assets in
question.318
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant asset, the Cubic
Judgment, was not a "blocked asset" at the time the court of appeals deci-
sion because it arose well after the 1981 Treasury Department order un-
blocking the assets.319 The 1981 order issued by the Treasury
Department authorized "[tiransactions involving property in which
Iran.. .has an interest[,] where the interest in the property.. .arises after
January 19, 1981."320 The Supreme Court held that Iran's interest in the
Cubic Judgment arose on December 7, 1998, when the district court con-
firmed the arbitration award, and thus fell within the terms of the Trea-
sury order.321 Further, the Court held that Iran's interest in the property
underlying the Cubic Judgment arose after January 19, 1981, because Iran
had agreed it would take a final decision about ownership of the property
after Cubic completed its sale of the system, which was in October
1982.322 Finally, the Court found that, even if the relevant asset were
Iran's pre-1982 interest in the air combat training system itself, the asset
was not blocked at the time of the court of appeals decision because the
interest fell directly within the scope of an Executive Order that required
property owned by Iran to be transferred as directed by the Iran
313. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2337
(2002). See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C.
2009).
314. Ministry of Def & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Elahi, 129 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (2009).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1738.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1739.
320. Id. (emphasis in original and citation omitted).
321. Id.
322. Id.
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government. 323
In Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia held that diplomatic properties in the United States
owned by Iran are not "blocked assets" under TRIA.3 2 4 The court re-
jected plaintiff's claim that the 2008 NDAA extended "blocked assets" to
include diplomatic properties.325
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION
A number of FSIA judicial decisions from 2009 also provide useful gui-
dance concerning some of the practical procedural issues that arise in
cases brought against foreign sovereigns, including service of process per-
sonal jurisdiction, discovery and removal. A brief review of certain nota-
ble decisions follows.
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service under FSIA is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a) and (b).
Those provisions set forth various methods of service, depending on
whether the party being served is: (a) a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion; or (b) an agency or instrumentality. 326
Service of process on foreign sovereigns under FSIA is governed by
§ 1608(a), which requires using the designated methods of service set
forth in the statute, in order: i.e., using the next method only if all pre-
ceding methods are not available: (1) in accordance with a special ar-
rangement between the plaintiff and the foreign state; (2) in accordance
with an applicable international convention on service; (3) by mail, return
receipt required, from the clerk of the court to the foreign state's ministry
of foreign affairs; or (4) by diplomatic channels through the State Depart-
ment in Washington, D.C. 3 2 7 Courts have held that because Congress
expressly created a sequential method of service, any deviation from this
strict sequential order without proper basis renders the service facially
invalid.328 Sequential requirements also exist for service on agencies and
323. In addition, the Supreme Court held that even if the assets were "blocked," the
plaintiff had waived his right to attach the property at issue by signing a waiver to
relinquish "all rights to execute against or attach property that is at issue in claims
against the United States before an international tribunal [or] that is the subject of
awards rendered by such tribunal," in return for partial compensation by the U.S.
government for the claim against Iran under a claims compensation scheme. Id. at
1741.
324. Bennett, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 160-62.
325. Id.
326. 28 U.S.C. 01601(a)-(b).
327. See, e.g., Smith v. Ghana Commercial Bank, Ltd., No. 08-5324, 2009 WL 3327206,
at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2009) (finding that service in accordance with Rule 4(f)(2)
was impermissible method of service on Republic of Ghana).
328. See, e.g., Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 623 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing
claim against Kuwait because plaintiffs served defendant by diplomatic means
under § 1608(a)(4) but could not demonstrate impossibility of service under first
three methods).
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instrumentalities under § 1608(b). 329
One issue that arose in 2009 was whether a party who amends a com-
plaint to add a claim under the amendments to the terrorism exception,
§ 1605A, must re-serve the complaint. In Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that to the ex-
tent plaintiffs asserted a new cause of action against Syria under § 1605A,
they should have served Syria pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 5(a)(2), which requires that new claims be served on defaulting par-
ties.330 The plaintiffs argued that their original complaint had included an
"allegation of a federal cause of action against Syria, a claim for solatium,
and a claim for punitive damages," and, thus, the new complaint would
assert the same claims.331 The court disagreed, stating that if plaintiffs
were to proceed in alleging a specific course of action under § 1605A, the
complaint should be amended and re-served. 332
But, another judge in the same district arrived at a different conclusion.
In In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, Judge Lamberth
concluded that precedent "strongly suggest[ed] that service is not re-
quired in actions that were pending under § 1605(a)(7) and which have
since been converted to § 1605A through the procedures in § 1083(c) of
the 2008 NDAA." 333 As the court explained, "even though actions con-
verted to § 1605A are now presenting what are new claims in the sense
that the substantive law is now federal law, they need not be considered
as new claims for purposes of the pleading requirements applicable to
these actions." 334 The court acknowledged the Gates decision of the pre-
vious month, but disagreed with the reasoning in that case for two rea-
sons.335 First, the Court concluded that it was not clear that Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 5 applies to actions against foreign sovereigns because
§ 1608 establishes specific rules governing service of process as to such
defendants. 336 In addition, the Court noted that, by its own terms, Rule
5(a)(2) only requires service where a new claim is presented in a plead-
ing; motions under § 1083(c)(2), and the NDAA provision permitting ret-
roactive claims against foreign state sponsors of terrorism, do not
constitute "pleadings" within the meaning of Rule 5.337
329. See generally 28 U.S.C. §1608(b).
330. Gates, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 90-91 (D.D.C. 2009).
331. Id. at 89.
332. Id. at 91.
333. In re Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 104 (citing Dammarell v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Bodoff v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
334. In re Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 106.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 106-07; see also Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiff need not re-serve Complaint asserting
claims under § 1605(A)).
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B. PERSONAL JURISDIcTION
FSIA confers personal jurisdiction as well as subject-matter jurisdiction
over certain claims against foreign sovereigns. As a general rule, FSIA
confers personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns where subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction has been established and service of process has been ac-
complished pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608.338 But, it remains an open
question whether courts also must consider the traditional constitutional
due process requirements-i.e., that there be "sufficient 'minimum con-
tacts' between the foreign state and the forum 'such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "339
In 2009, in Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Company
of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Second Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit
and the majority of other jurisdictions that have considered this ques-
tion 340 and held that foreign states are not persons protected by the Fifth
Amendment and thus do not enjoy constitutional due process rights that
may be invoked as a defense in FSIA proceedings.34 1
C. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
If a foreign sovereign is properly served with a complaint but refuses to
answer, move, or otherwise respond, the court may, in its discretion,
grant a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.3 4 2 Such judgments are
not uncommon in foreign-sovereign litigation, as foreign states often
choose to ignore claims asserted against them in U.S. courts for political,
economic, practical, or other reasons. 343
Under FSIA "[n]o judgment by default shall be entered. . .against a
foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to
338. See, e.g., Box, 2009 WL 3163551, at *4.
339. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
340. Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the A zer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399
(2d Cir. 2009) (citing D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Price as support for its holding).
341. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); Cassirer, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Rux, 2005 WL
2086202, at *18; Cruz v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2001);
O'Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 794 (W.D.Ky. 2007), affd, 549 F.3d at
431.
342. See, e.g., Lasheen v. Loomis Co., No. 01-0227, 2008 WL 2880408, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
July 22, 2008).
343. See, e.g., Gates, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 81; Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1310
(11th Cir. 2009); Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 24; Box, 2009 WL 3163551, at *1; Acree,
658 F. Supp. 2d at 126. One court also upheld a default judgment against the
Palestinian Authority, which belatedly asserted sovereign immunity. Estates of
Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 613 F. Supp. 2d 219, 228, 231 (D.R.I. 2009). Where a
sovereign makes a limited appearance, however, courts will likely decline to enter
a default judgment. Smith, 2009 WL 3327206, at *10 (refusing to enter default
judgment where defendants had made limited appearance indicating intention to
defend against claims).
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relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 3 4 4 Moreover, "[u]pon evalu-
ation, the Court may accept any uncontroverted evidence presented by
plaintiffs as true." 3 4 5 Nevertheless, courts have noted that default judg-
ments are a "sanction of last resort" and that "there is a strong policy
favoring the adjudication of a case on its merits," 3 4 6 particularly where
the defendant is a foreign sovereign. As one court noted, "intolerant ad-
herence to default judgments against foreign states could adversely af-
fect" U.S. foreign relations.347
Once a default judgment has been entered, a foreign sovereign may
seek relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which permits
judgments to be overturned under certain circumstances, including mis-
take or excused neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other rea-
sons justifying relief.3 4 8
Foreign sovereigns may, however, find it difficult to obtain relief under
this rule. For example, in The Estates of Ungar v. The Palestinian Author-
ity, 3 4 9 the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island declined to
vacate a default judgment issued against the Palestinian Authority and
Palestinian Liberation Organization. In that case, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the initial complaint, but failed to respond to an
amended complaint. 350 In refusing to allow defendants to set aside the
$116 million default judgment entered against them, the First Circuit
noted that sovereign immunity is not a "trump card that may be held in
reserve until a defendant sees fit to play it."351 In denying the request to
vacate the judgment, the court stressed the fact that courts are hesitant to
overturn judgments under Rule 60(b) absent a showing that the opposing
party would suffer no prejudice. 3 5 2 Here, if the request were granted, the
court explained, it "would be extremely prejudicial to the Plaintiffs be-
cause they would be unable to conduct much of the crucial discovery that
would have been possible years ago when they first requested it."353 The
court therefore rejected the request for relief.3 5 4
On the other hand, in Acree v. Republic of Iraq, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia granted the defendant's request to set aside
an entry of default judgment because it had "identified several potentially
meritorious defenses."35 5 The court held that three factors should be bal-
anced in determining whether to set aside a default: whether the default
was willful; whether it would prejudice the plaintiff; and whether the al-
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).
345. Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
346. Acree, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (internal citations omitted).
347. Id. (internal citations omitted).
348. Estates of Ungar, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 228-29.
349. Id. at 231.
350. Id. at 222.
351. Id. at 228. (quoting First Circuit decision in prior proceedings).
352. Id. at 229.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 231.
355. Acree, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
leged defense was meritorious.356 A meritorious defense, the court ex-
plained, was one that "contain[ed] even a hint of a suggestion which,
proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense."357 Iraq had raised
several potentially viable defenses, including foreign sovereign immu-
nity.358 Moreover, Iraq pointed out that significant issues relating to
Iraq's immunity were pending in the Supreme Court.359 The court held
that, under these circumstances, the balance of factors favored setting
aside the default judgment. 360
D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a U.S. court may decline
to hear a claim if: 1) allowing the claim would impose a serious inconve-
nience on the defendant and 2) there exists an adequate alternative fo-
rum for the claim to be heard. 361 In 2009, courts in two cases declined to
dismiss actions against sovereigns on forum non conveniens grounds.
In UNC Lear Serv., Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,362 the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the district court had not abused its discretion in declining
to dismiss the action based on forum non conveniens. The appellate court
agreed that, while there were adequate alternative fora, the balance of
private and public interest factors did not strongly favor dismissal.363
Factors relating to privacy interests include relative ease of access to
sources of proof, cost of attendance of witnesses, and other practical is-
sues. 364 Public interest factors include court congestion, local interest in
having local controversies decided in local courts, and the forum's famili-
arity with the applicable law.3 65 In the case at hand, witnesses were lo-
cated in both fora and translation of documents would be required no
matter which forum heard the case.3 6 6 The court concluded that, while
both the United States and Saudi Arabia had an interest in trying the
case, the United States had a greater interest because most of the activity
under the contract at issue took place in Texas. 367
In Figueiredo v. Republic of Peru, the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York declined to dismiss an action seeking enforce-
ment of an arbitral award against Peru.368 The court found that Peruvian
courts would not be an adequate forum since the plaintiff could not seek
356. Id. at 127 (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
357. Id. at 129 (internal citations omitted).
358. Id.
359. Id. (referring to Supreme Court's decision in Beaty, 129 S. Ct. at 2183).
360. Id. at 130.
361. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1994) (quoting Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981)).
362. UNC Lear Serv., 581 F.3d at 222.
363. Id. at 221.
364. Id. at 220-21 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
365. Id. at 221.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Figueiredo, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
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Peru's assets in the United States through an action in a Peruvian
court. 3 6 9 In addition, U.S. courts had "an interest in enforcing commer-
cial arbitration agreements in international contracts." 370
369. Id. at 376.
370. Id.
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